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Abstract
In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an ex-
change do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily aﬀord them.
At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who
benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone
participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ
intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for
a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hith-
erto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where
a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her
type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence
of non-monotone equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In many decentralised markets for heterogeneous goods or services, exchange
is aided by intermediaries. Even if trade is feasible and legal without them,
intermediaries exist because they increase the realised gains from trade by
lowering the traders’ search costs and by reducing the extent of mismatch.
Nevertheless, not all traders use intermediaries. Traders who stand to gain
little from exchange may simply find intermediation too expensive, but one
often sees the traders on the two sides of the market who have the highest
surplus between them decide to trade in the direct searchmarket — risking severe
mismatch and/or incurring high search expenditure — despite the availability
of “cheap” intermediation. For example, as the title hints, the most desirable
singles do not advertise in “lonely hearts” newspaper columns, nor do they
join on-line dating services; also, in many instances, the best jobs are not filled
through agencies, the best shops are not in shopping centres, the most exclusive
holidays are not on oﬀer in travel agencies and the best properties do not come
on the open market.1 As further examples, some banks do not allow mortgage
brokers to oﬀer their products, and some insurers advertise the fact that they
are not available on web comparison sites.
Formally, the common feature of the above examples is that the traders’
decisions to enter the intermediated (sub)market are non-monotone in type.2
1But note that very diﬀerent outcomes can occur in similar markets: for example, on
2 December 2009, the most expensive family residence in London available for sale online
had an asking price of $66 million. The most expensive one in Rome, a market with not
too dissimilar supply and demand, was on oﬀer at $8.7 million, a figure certainly well below
the prices paid for residences at upper end of the Roman market. This dichotomy is neatly
captured by the multiplicity of equilibria in our model.
2Solid empirical evidence linking types and propensity to use intermediaries is hard to
come by. The recent paper by Hitsch et al (2010), briefly discussed in Section 5, hints at some
non-monotonicity. In general, however, survey studies of the intermediated marriage market
(e.g. Goodwin (1990), Bozon and Heran (1989), Kalmijn and Flap (2001) and Rosenfeld and
1
While this ineﬃcient outcome is clearly a coordination failure, whether it can be
supported by an equilibrium depends on the specific modelling set-up. In this
article we investigate the features of a model that delivers such non-monotone
entry decisions, and we explore the intuition underlying these equilibria. Given
the prevalence of markets where traders have the choice between intermediated
or direct trade, it is surprising that only a few of the numerous theoretical
articles on intermediated markets allow direct and intermediated trade to co-
exist. Gehrig (1993) is the seminal paper in this area: he posits a one-shot
random matching market, where the maximisation of overall gains from trade
requires matching high valuation buyers with low valuation sellers: eﬃcient
matching is negatively assortative. In his equilibrium, buyers and sellers who
trade are separated by a “threshold”: buyers (sellers) with valuation below
(above) the threshold trade in the direct market, buyers (sellers) with valua-
tion above (below) the threshold trade via the intermediary. Gehrig’s finding
that trade is via the intermediary for the matches with the highest surplus is
confirmed by Fingleton (1997) who models intermediaries as suppliers of liq-
uidity, in the sense that they buy from the sellers before securing a buyer to
sell to. Rather than a flat fee, in Yavas¸ (1994) the intermediary charges a com-
mission on the gains from trade. A second diﬀerence is that Yavas¸ (1994) is a
search, not a matching model. Both modelling assumptions make intermedia-
tion the less attractive the higher a type is and thus, quite naturally, he finds
a reverse threshold: traders’ participation strategies are monotone in type, but
the keener types search directly and the less keen go to the intermediary.
A crucial feature of markets with optional intermediation is that each trader’s
willingness to employ the intermediary depends on which traders decide to join
Thomas (2010)), the well established literature on users of real estate agents (Zumpano et
al 1996), and the more limited one on job exchanges (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996) contain
very limited information about users’ types. Conversely, comprehensive studies of individual
preferences in marriage markets, such as Choo and Siow (2006), do not have information
about use of intermediation.
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on the other side of the market. In the existing literature, equilibria are “co-
ordination” ones, leading naturally to multiplicity. As mentioned above, all
equilibria are similar in nature, characterised by a single threshold, possibly a
“reversed” one; in particular, traders’ choices are never non-monotone in equi-
librium. This does not tally with the stylised facts motivating our paper. We
show here that to explain these observations, it is necessary to eschew the sim-
plified modelling of negotiation between matched traders used by the previous
literature, which either studied static models (as discussed above) or assumed
a dynamic set-up, but with non-transferable utility (Bloch and Ryder, 2000).
In contrast, our model displays a richer dynamic set-up where, crucially, a
matched trader’s share of the surplus depends on the disagreement, or con-
tinuation, payoﬀs, and therefore on which equilibrium the market finds itself
in.
We consider a two-sided market where the traders’ types are complements:
higher types benefit more from trade with higher types than lower types do. At
the beginning of the first trading period, each trader chooses whether or not to
pay a fixed fee to “join” the intermediary. If they join, they are matched assor-
tatively with those who have joined from the other side. Traders who stay out
are randomly matched among those who have stayed out on the other side of
the market. Once matched, traders negotiate; crucially, refusing an exchange
does not entail the loss of all benefit from trade because all the agents who
have not traded can re-enter the market later.3 In this dynamic set-up, the
outcome of bargaining is a function of the continuation values of the traders,
which in turn depend on their type. We find equilibria with the following fea-
tures: high quality traders trade in the direct search market, and may suﬀer a
delay in finding a suitable partner; traders with medium quality use the inter-
3Burani (2008) has a similar, fully dynamic set-up; however, for tractability, she needs to
restrict attention to two types on each side of the market, ruling out non-monotone equilibria
by construction.
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mediary, and so trade immediately with probability 1; low quality traders also
search directly, even when the price of intermediation is per se insuﬃcient to
deter them. The middle quality traders who use the intermediary are therefore
“sandwiched” between the high and low quality ones who do not, and so we
label this a “sandwich equilibrium”.
This seemingly appealing intuition disguises however that for this outcome
to emerge as an equilibrium stringent conditions must hold, suggesting therefore
that sandwich equilibria have more to them than simple coordination. We
show in Proposition 4 that, for a sandwich equilibrium to exist, the traders’
bargaining share must be suﬃciently increasing in their own type.4 The logic
of this requirement can be gleaned by considering the decisions of two types: a
high type, H, who does not join the intermediary, and a medium type,M , who
does join. In order for H not to want to deviate from her equilibrium strategy
and join the intermediary instead, the probability of meeting a low type in
the open market must be suﬃciently low. Since matching is type-independent,
this is true for every trader. That is, any agent who stays out must have a
relatively high chance of meeting a high type. Given this, why does M not
want to deviate? What stops staying out and perhaps meeting a high type
from becoming an alluring prospect for M? It must be that if M meets H, he
receives a low enough share of the surplus. Given the Nash bargaining protocol,
this in turn is possible if M has a suﬃciently lower continuation value than H.
The paper develops this argument in detail. The model is presented in
Section 2, and the results in Section 3. There, in Proposition 3, we show
that sandwich equilibria do indeed exist if the continuation value is increasing
in type and in Proposition 4 that they do not if the continuation value is
the same for all traders. Section 4 discusses the results and reports some
numerical simulations, which indicates that the set of sandwich equilibria is
4In particular, with non-transferable utility, as assumed by Bloch and Ryder (2000),
sandwich equilibria cannot happen.
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“large”. Section 5 concludes, relating the analysis to some empirical evidence.
2 The model
2.1 The traders
We study a two-sided market where the participants meet in pairs and share
the surplus jointly available to them. For specificity we refer to the two sides
as buyers and sellers, but the set-up clearly applies to more general situations,
such as the marriage market. Each trader is characterised by a single attribute:5
a seller by the quality she oﬀers, denoted by q, and a buyer by the value he
places on quality, v. We assume that the (empirical) distribution of attributes
on both sides of the market is common knowledge among the traders.6
The attributes of matched traders are complements: a high value buyer
appreciates a given increase in quality more than a low value buyer. Note that
this means that the most eﬃcient matching is the perfectly assortative one (see
Becker, 1973). For definiteness, we assume that the joint gross surplus available
to the matched pair of a seller of quality q and a buyer of value v is given by
2vq.
Within a matched pair of traders, utility is transferable and the outcome
of negotiation is given by the Nash Bargaining Solution. That is, each trader
obtains the sum of (i) the payoﬀ he/she would obtain if trade did not happen —
the disagreement payoﬀ —, and (ii) one half of the net surplus from trade. The
5In practice traders are diﬀerentiated along several, imperfectly correlated dimensions. A
model capturing this could generate sandwich equilibria even if behaviour were monotone
along each dimension. By compressing the diﬀerences among traders along one dimension
we “stack the deck” against sandwich equilibria, giving more robustness to our analysis.
6The role of this assumption, which simplifies the analysis, is to ensure that in equilibrium
the traders can predict with certainty whether or not they will be matched with a given group
of traders on the other side of the market.
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latter is given by the diﬀerence between the gross surplus and the sum of the
parties’ disagreement payoﬀs. If it is negative, no trade takes place.
The nature of the disagreement payoﬀ, that is whether it is fixed or type
dependent, aﬀects the equilibrium set greatly. In a static set-up, there is no
future and so the status quo payoﬀ is fixed at 0. As we show below, in this
case it is impossible to capture the empirical regularities mentioned in the
introduction. In order to endogenise the disagreement payoﬀ, we build a simple
dynamic model.
Time is divided in periods. At the beginning of the first period, traders on
both sides of the market simultaneously choose whether they wish to participate
in the direct market or to employ the intermediary. Their choices create two
submarkets: the intermediated and the direct market. The direct market is
anonymous: each trader on the same side has identical expectations about
whether she will find a match an in case yes, who with. Joint rationality of
these expectations implies that, in equilibrium, the likelihood of meeting a
given type must be proportional to the empirical type distribution. We assume
that the matching technology is eﬃcient: all the traders on the short side get
matched to someone on the long side. If the matched traders trade, they leave
the market. If they do not trade, they stay in the market, and will be matched
again in the second period. All unmatched traders continue in the market as
well. There is no entry of new traders. The continuation payoﬀ of the traders
who return to the market after the first period satisfies the following condition.
Assumption 1 The present value of trading in the future equals a proportion
λ ∈ (0, 1) of the utility a trader would receive if in the second period he/she
were perfectly assortatively matched among the remaining traders and shared
the gross surplus equally.
Assumption 1 can be relaxed, its important feature is that a trader’s con-
tinuation payoﬀ increases suﬃciently with his/her type, which we show to be
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crucial to establish the existence of sandwich equilibria. Notice that the contin-
uation payoﬀ depends on the other traders’ period 1 choices: a trader’s chances
tomorrow depend on who is not trading today, and will therefore be still around
tomorrow.
λ is a measure of the cost of delaying trade. For example, if, in the second
period, all traders who have not traded in the first period were indeed matched
assortatively, say by a free intermediary, then λ would simply be the discount
factor.7 Alternatively, Assumption 1 holds if traders use hyperbolic discount-
ing, whereby the discounted present value of a reward W in period t > 0 is
given by λγtW , with γ ∼= 1. This means that traders believe that they will
become infinitely patient from the next period onwards, and therefore believe
that they will be willing to wait indefinitely for the perfect match, leading to
the eﬃcient assortative matching.8
2.2 The intermediary
The simplest form of intermediation is one where the intermediary selects as
“members”, through price or other means, only a subset of traders from both
sides of the market (see, for example, Damiano and Li, 2007), and subsequently
matches its members randomly. This merely ensures that members meet with
members only, but already reduces mismatch. In practice, intermediaries, from
7Given assortative matching in the second period, no unmatched traders are left in the
market beyond it, and so it is irrelevant whether or not the game continues after period 2.
8Note that our set-up satisfies the suﬃcient conditions proposed by Shimer and Smith
(2000) for assortative matching in a dynamic search equilibrium. Damiano et al. (2005) imply
that such a dynamic matching model would unravel and lead to pooling instead of assortative
matching. However, their result depends crucially on the assumption of a per period fixed
cost of participation. With discounting only, as in our model, assortative matching is the
limit for infinitely patient players. Lu and McAfee (1996) use simulations to establish this
in a closely related model without intermediation.
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tour operators through online dating services to wholesalers of grain and tea,9
make very good use of their understanding of their members’ characteristics to
improve the eﬃciency of matches, by arranging the traders into fine clusters
and restricting matches to within each cluster. This practice approximates
assortative matching, and, for the sake of simplicity, we take it to the extreme
and assume that the intermediary has access to a costless, perfectly assortative
matching technology.10 Thus the intermediary will match the highest members
from each side of the markets, the two second highest ones, and so on. The low
ranked members on the long side will remain unmatched, and try their luck in
the second period. For ease of exposition, we work with a continuum of traders.
Taking it literally, this would imply that if in equilibrium the same measure of
traders joined the intermediary on the two sides of the market then a deviating
trader who was not supposed to join in equilibrium would still get matched if he
joined, as the measure of traders joining would still be equal on the two sides.
This would be unsatisfactory, as a repeated use of the assumption would lead
to a paradox, in a similar fashion to the generation of thick indiﬀerence curves.
Our preferred way to solve this problem is to view the case of the continuum
as the limit case of a model with a finite number of traders. In a finite set-up,
if in equilibrium the same number of traders joined then a deviating one (with
a low valuation) would be the lowest on the long side and hence would not
be matched. To retain the logic of the finite set-up in the continuum case,
we assume that, when the same measure of traders on the two sides join the
intermediary, an additional trader with type lower than all those who have
joined the intermediary on his side of the market would remain unmatched.
9See for example, Clerides et al. (2008), Hitsch et al (2010) Gabre-Mahdin (2001) and
Koo and Lo (2004), respectively. Biglaiser (1993) gives a theoretical treatment.
10In related contexts it has been shown that the loss of eﬃciency from a “coarse” relative
to a “fine” clustering is very low and, consequently, perfect assortative matching is not a
particularly strong assumption: see McAfee (2002) and Hoppe et al. (2008).
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Joining the intermediary11 entails paying an exogenously given fee c > 0,
which is the same for all traders.12
We end this Section with a summary of the extensive from of the game.
1. At the beginning of Period 1 all traders observe the distribution of at-
tributes in the market and then simultaneously decide whether to join
the intermediary and pay the joining fee c > 0, or to trade in the direct
market.
2. Matching takes place in the two separate submarkets. Matching in the
direct market is random, with the intermediary is assortative. If the
joiners are of equal measure, then a deviating trader with a valuation
below the minimum for joining in equilibrium will remain unmatched.
Matched traders observe each other’s type and, if and only if their joint
surplus is non-negative, they trade according to the Nash Bargaining
Solution. Buyers and sellers who trade leave the game.
3. In Period 2 the remaining traders are matched assortatively and once
they have observed each other’s type they trade according to the Nash
Bargaining Solution (with zero status quo payoﬀs). Seen from Period 1,
the payoﬀs from agreements in Period 2 are discounted by λ.
11As will become apparent, our model is equivalent to a situation where the intermediary’s
fee is paid only by the traders who are matched.
12Notice how our model could be reinterpreted as a special case of two-sided markets,
where traders are restricted to trade via “platforms”. One platform is direct trade, the other
is the intermediary. The former has lower eﬃciency and an exogenously given zero fee. To
our knowledge, such a set-up has not been analysed in this literature. The most closely
related papers are Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Damiano and Li (2007,
2008) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 A simple finite market
We begin with a simple example. While our interest is in the study of large
anonymous markets, and so the more natural set-up is with a continuum of
traders, considering first a finite market highlights the intuition underlying our
results and assumptions. Suppose therefore that we have n buyers and n sellers,
with the sets of types, {v1, ..., vn} and {q1, ..., qn}, where vi 6 vi+1, and qi 6 qi+1
i = 1, ..., n − 1. Consider the following strategy vector: traders {v1, vn} and
{q1, qn} stay in the market and all other traders join the intermediary. For
suitable parameter values, this is an equilibrium. We show this with several
simplifying assumptions, and the reader should bear in mind that the restric-
tions they imply are suﬃcient, but not necessary for the existence of sandwich
equilibria.
In order for the above strategy profile to be an equilibrium, no type can
have an incentive to deviate: Consider the highest type, vn, first. Suppose that
λ >
2q1vn
qnvn + q1v1
. (1)
If (1) holds, type vn will not trade if matched with the lowest type q1.13 It
follows that vn’s expected payoﬀ if he stays in the market is 1+λ2 vnqn: if he is
not matched with type qn initially, he will in period 2, since qn (who is matched
to v1) by the mirror image of (1) will also refuse to trade. If type vn deviates
and joins the intermediary, he will be matched to type qn−1. To calculate his
payoﬀ, we need to work out his reservation payoﬀs in this match, and to do so
we need to consider what happens in the event of a break-down in their (vn
and qn−1) negotiations. Given the deviation, there is one buyer (type v1) and
two sellers (qn and q1) in the open market in period 1. This implies that:
13When vn and q1 are matched, their respective reservation utilities are λqnvn and λq1v1,
and so the surplus is 2q1vn−λqnvn−λq1v1. Trade does not occur if this surplus is negative,
which gives the condition on λ.
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• with probability 1
2
, v1 and q1 are matched and trade, and in period 2 there
is only buyer qn and seller v2 (who cannot find a match through the inter-
mediary). Therefore, in the event of a break-down in the negotiation for
the pair hvn, qn−1i, the period 2 market would be {{vn, v2} , {qn, qn−1}}.
• with probability 1
2
v1 is matched to qn, and they do not trade but return
to the market in period 2, and q1 is unmatched. So in the event of a
break-down in the negotiation for the pair hvn, qn−1i, the period 2 market
would be {{vn, v2, v1} , {qn, qn−1, q1}}.
In either of these cases, in period 2 vn will be matched to qn, and his period
1 partner, qn−1, will be matched to v2. To sum up, vn’s deviation payoﬀ is
λvnqn +
¡
1
2
(2vnqn−1 − λvnqn − λqn−1v2)
¢
− c, if the surplus from trade, the
term in the brackets, is non negative, which is the case if
λ 6 2vnqn−1
vnqn + qn−1v2
(2)
If we assume the above to hold, then the diﬀerence between the equilibrium
and the deviation payoﬀ for type vn is:
λqn−1v2
2
+ vn
µ
1
2
qn − qn−1
¶
+ c (3)
Next consider a type who uses the intermediary in equilibrium, call him vi.
His equilibrium payoﬀ is viqi−c. Suppose he contemplates a deviation. He will
find himself in a market where there are three types on his side, {v1, vi, vn},
and two types on the other side {q1, qn}. In the next period, q2 will be there,
plus the unmatched v type, and whoever has failed to trade. So we have three
possible outcomes, each with probability 1
3
.
• vi is unmatched. In the following period, either the market is {{vi} , {q2}},
because period 1matching was assortative, or it is {{vn, vi, v1} , {qn, q2, q1}},
if q1 was matched to vn. In both cases, vi will be matched to q2 in period
2, so his deviation payoﬀ in this case is λviq2.
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• vi is matched to type q1. Either v1 is unmatched, and qn and vn trade with
each other, so the next period market, in the case of a break-down in the
{vi, q1} negotiation is {{vi, v1} , {q2, q1}}, or vn is unmatched, and qn and
v1 do not trade, so the next period market is {{vn, vi, v1} , {qn, q2, q1}}.
In both cases, vi is matched in the second period to q2, and so the reser-
vation payoﬀ for the traders is λviq2 for vi and λv1q1 for q1. So the devi-
ation payoﬀ for trader vi is λviq2 +max
©
1
2
(2viq1 − λviq2 − λv1q1) , 0
ª
=
1
2
(2viq1 + λviq2 − λv1q1), if
λ < 2
viq1
viq2 + v1q1
, i = 2, . . . , n− 1. (4)
• vi is matched to type qn. Again there are two cases, the unmatched
buyer can be either v1 or vn. If v1 is unmatched, qn and vn trade with
each other, and the remaining match hq1, vni does not lead to trade, so the
next period market, in the case of a break-down in the hvi, qni negotiation
is {{vn, vi, v1} , {qn, q2, q1}}. If instead vn is unmatched, then the post
break-down market is {{vn, vi} , {qn, q2}}. Again, in both these cases vi
will be matched to q2, so her period 2 payoﬀ is 12 (2viqn + λviq2 − λvnqn).
Putting the above three observations together the diﬀerence between equi-
librium and deviation payoﬀ of player vi is
2vi (3qi − q1 − qn)− λ (4viq2 − v1q1 − vnqn)
6
− c (5)
Finally, the lowest type buyer, v1, would certainly be unmatched if he joined
the intermediary, so deviating only (possibly) delays his trade with q1, in expec-
tation lowering his payoﬀ. If (1), (2) and (4) (and their mirror images for the
other side of the market) hold, and both (3) and (5) (and their mirror counter-
parts) are non-negative, then this combination of strategies is an equilibrium.
As an example,14 this happens if λ = 0.8, c = 0.014, and the two sides of the
14The calculations are available at sites.google.com/site/giannidefraja/.
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market have types {0.98, 0.6, ..., 0.48, 0.32} and {0.97, 0.55, ..., 0.45, 0.28} and
any combination of types for the traders ranked 3, ..., n−2: they join the inter-
mediary and all trade with their match, since (4) holds for every i = 2, . . . , n−1.
It is relatively straightforward, though it becomes notationally complex very
rapidly, to add traders at the top and at the bottom of the type distribution,
who do not join the intermediary, and so to obtain equilibria where more than
four traders use the direct market.
Though simple, the example illustrates an important feature of sandwich
equilibria: the continuation payoﬀs, following deviations, of type vn and of
type vn−1 are radically diﬀerent. The reason is that type vn, if instead of
following the equilibrium strategy, deviates and joins the intermediary to be
matched with qn−1 will have a very strong hand in the negotiation, because,
in the next period, qn−1 would be matched to the lowest type among those
who have joined the intermediary, v2: and so, when matched to qn−1, vn will
have the lion’s share of their joint surplus. If however vn−1 were to deviate and
join the market, he would, by the same argument, have a very weak hand in
a negotiation with the top type, qn (which of course happens with probability
less than 1, as there is also trader q1 in the market). So there is a discontinuity,
determined by the diﬀerence in the bargaining strength, which in turn depends
on the dynamic nature of game, between the payoﬀs of the lower type in the
top group of traders in the market, who will be matched with a trader in the
same group, and the top trader in the intermediary, who will be matched to
the least desirable trader among those who join the intermediary in period 1.
3.2 A continuum of traders
We now consider the general case, where there are a continuum of risk neutral
traders — of equal measure — on each side of the market. The buyers’ values
and the sellers’ qualities are distributed according to strictly positive density
functions fB (v) and fS (q) in [0, 1]. We have seen in the previous section
13
that the distribution of attributes need not be symmetric for the existence
of a sandwich equilibrium. Nonetheless, for simplicity we assume henceforth
that fB (t) = fS (t) for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we can refer to a generic
trader’s type as t ∈ [0, 1], with values distributed according to the strictly
positive function f (t). We also define F (t) =
R t
0
f (x) dx, which we normalise
by F (1) = 1.15 We begin by calculating the payoﬀs in the case where the
joining decisions mirror each other on the two sides of the market. Let A be
the set of types that do not join the intermediary, and let µ (A) denote the
measure of this set.
Proposition 1 If the set of types that join the intermediary is the same on
both sides, then the payoﬀ of a trader of type t ∈ [0, 1] is
t2 − c, (6)
if he/she joins the intermediary, and
λt2 +
R
A
max
©
tq − λ
2
(q2 + t2) , 0
ª
f (q) dq
µ (A)
, (7)
if he/she does not join.
Proof. (6) is obvious: since the intermediary matches the members assortatively,
and since the n-th ranked type that joins the intermediary is the same on both sides
of the market, type t is matched with type t and they trade immediately. By doing so,
they obtain payoﬀ t2−c, because, since they have the same outside option, they share
the gross surplus equally, from which the joining fee is subtracted. Consider next (7),
the payoﬀ for not joining the intermediary. This is simply the weighted average payoﬀ
of all possible matches. The probability of a match with type q is f(q)µ(A) . The payoﬀ to
type t following a match with type q is max
©
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
, 0
ª
. To show this, note
15Note that the type distributions are deterministic, while in the direct market the traders
(rational) belief is that the relative likelihood that they are matched to type p rather than
type q is given by pq . This set-up avoids possible complications that might arise with defining
a random matching process with a continuum of traders (see, for example, Alos-Ferrer,1999).
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that in equilibrium, the continuation payoﬀ of a type t trader is λt2. This is the case
because, in period 2, the type distribution is the same on the two sides of the market:
in the first period symmetry holds by assumption and, by the law of large numbers,
the distribution of “leavers” is also the same on both sides. Therefore, trade between
t and q occurs in the first period if and only if they obtain a non-negative surplus
from trading, that is if 2tq − λ
¡
q2 + t2
¢
> 0, and (7) follows.
Based on the proof of Proposition 1, Corollary 1 identifies which matches
lead to trade.
Corollary 1 If the set of types that join the intermediary is the same on both
sides, a type v trader trades with a type q trader in the first period if and only
if q ∈
h
1−
√
1−λ2
λ v,
1+
√
1−λ2
λ v
i
.
Figure 1 illustrates this: trade occurs only if the matched traders’ type
vector is in the grey area. Notice that, since λ → 1 implies 1−
√
1−λ2
λ → 1,
as λ increases, the grey area shrinks to the diagonal: if traders are infinitely
patient, they are unwilling to “trade down” and matching must be assortative.
Vice versa, if λ → 0, we have 1−
√
1−λ2
λ → 0, and the grey area tends to the
whole square [0, 1]2: if waiting becomes infinitely costly then any match leads
to trade as the gross surplus is non-negative.
As mentioned in the introduction, the equilibria derived in the existing
literature stratify the types into two groups. Definition 1 captures this idea.
Definition 1 A t-threshold equilibrium is a SPE with the property that all
traders with type greater than or equal to t join the intermediary.
As one would expect, our model exhibits a rich multiplicity of threshold
equilibria, as the following proposition shows. Let r = 1−
√
1−λ2
λ and σ (λ) =
λ+
R 1
r
¡
q − λ
2
(q2 + 1)
¢
f(q)dq. Note that σ (λ) ∈ [0, 1], with σ (1) = 1.
Proposition 2 For every joining fee c ∈ [0, 1− σ (λ)), there exists x(c) ∈
[0, 1) such that a t-threshold equilibrium exists for every t ∈ [x(c), 1].
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Figure 1: The set of matched pairs who agree to trade.
Proof. Fix a putative t-threshold equilibrium. By Proposition 1, types v > t ex-
pect a payoﬀ of v2−c in equilibrium, whereas deviating implies an expected payoﬀ of
λv2+
R t
0 max{vq−λ2 (q2+v2),0}f(q)dq
F (t) which, by Corollary 1, equals λv
2+
R t
vr(vq−
λ
2 (q
2+v2))f(q)dq
F (t) .
Let D (t, v) be the diﬀerence between the equilibrium and deviation payoﬀs for type
v > t. We start with establishing that D(t, v) is increasing in v, so that it is suﬃcient
to check incentive compatibility for the threshold type, v = t.
∂D(t, v)
∂v
= 2v (1− λ)−
Z t
vr
(q − λv) f(q)
F (t)
dq +
r
¡
v2r − λ2 (r2v2 + v2)
¢
f(vr)
F (t)
≥ 2t (1− λ)−
Z t
vr
(t− λt) f(q)
F (t)
dq = t (1− λ)
µ
1 +
F (vr)
F (t)
¶
≥ 0.
Here the first inequality follows from the fact that v ≥ t ≥ q and that the last term
is 0, as the lower bound of the integral is by definition the value of q for which the
integrand is 0.
Next, observe that D(1, 1) = 1 − c − σ (λ). As the integrand in σ (λ) is strictly
increasing, we obtain a strict upper bound on σ (λ) by setting q = 1 in the integrand:
σ (λ) < λ + (1− λ) (1 − F (r)) < 1. Hence, 1 − σ (λ) > 0, so for c ∈ [0, 1 − σ (λ)),
D(1, 1) > 0.
Then, by the continuity of the function D (t, t) in t, for any c ∈ [0, 1−σ (λ)) there
exists a type x(c) < 1, such that for all v > x(c), we have D(v, v) > 0.
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Finally, consider types v < t. Their equilibrium payoﬀ is at least λv2, while
their deviation payoﬀ is λv2 − c, since, given that they are the lowest type on the
long side of the intermediated sub-market, they would remain unmatched with the
intermediary. Hence deviation is not profitable.
When intermediation is free, a more precise characterisation is possible:
x(0) = 0.
Corollary 2 When c = 0 there is a threshold equilibrium for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Take any t > 0. We show that there exists a t-threshold equilibrium,
which establishes the result. Consider first types below t: in the second period they
are assortatively matched, and so their period 1 reservation payoﬀ is the same in
equilibrium and following a deviation. However, they trade with zero probability
in period 1 if they deviate (the intermediary will not match them), and with non-
zero probability in equilibrium. Therefore, it is preferable for them to follow their
putative equilibrium strategy and stay out. Consider now a type v > t. If she follows
the equilibrium strategy, she is matched by the intermediary to type v, trades, and
obtains a payoﬀ of v2. If she deviates, she is matched to type q < t, which gives her
a payoﬀ of λv2 if she does not trade and λv2 + vq − λ2
¡
v2 + q2
¢
if she trades. Since
the last expression is strictly increasing in q for q < v and equals v2 when q = v),
it is no more than v2 for q 6 v, and so type v does not gain by deviating from her
putative equilibrium strategy. This shows that no-one has an incentive to deviate
and so there is a t-threshold equilibrium.
Hence, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a 0-threshold equilibrium if and only
if c = 0. In words, with no intermediation fee, and only with no intermediation
fee, it is an equilibrium for all traders to join, which is the eﬃcient outcome,
given our assumption that the intermediary can sort costlessly.
Threshold equilibria are identified in the existing literature, and have a
natural explanation: the top traders join a club, which, although open to all
17
who are willing to pay the fee, has little use for those whose valuation and
quality is below the threshold, as they will be cold-shouldered by the members.
This is a straightforward “coordination” explanation, each trader wants to do
whatever his or her “natural” partner does, highlighted sharply in the extreme
case of free intermediation, when any type t ∈ [0, 1] can be the threshold in a
t-threshold. As we see below, a coordination explanation is not suﬃcient for
the emergence of sandwich equilibria.
But this natural equilibrium configuration is not the only possible one in
our dynamic setting. We show next that there are equilibria where only traders
with intermediate types join the intermediary, while “top” and “bottom” type
traders search directly.
Definition 2 A
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium with 0 ≤ t < t < 1 is a SPE,
where in period 1 a trader joins the intermediary if and only if he/she has type
t ∈
£
t, t
¤
. If 0 < t, the sandwich equilibrium is non-degenerate.
The following lemma, which we need in the proof of our main result, is of
independent interest.
Lemma 1 In a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium, the deviation payoﬀ of a type t
trader is given by:
λt2 − c for t ∈ [0, t) , (8)
λtt+
R
[0,t)∪(t,1] max
©
tq − λ
2
(q2 + tt) , 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
for t ∈
£
t, t
¤
, (9)
λt2 +max
½
tt− λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
, 0
¾
− c for t ∈
¡
t, 1
¤
. (10)
Proof. If a low type (t ∈ [0, t)) deviates and joins the intermediary, she pays
the joining fee c, does not trade, and is assortatively matched in the next period.
Her payoﬀ is therefore λt2 − c.
Consider a middle type next: t ∈
£
t, t
¤
. Her deviation payoﬀ is determined by the
Nash bargaining solution and it is a function of her continuation value, which is λtt.
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To see this, note that, following a deviation, a seller of type q is either matched to a
high type (with probability
1−F(t)
1−F(t)+F (t)
) or matched to a low type (with probability
F (t)
1−F(t)+F (t)
). In both cases, all the top buyers who reach period 2 will be matched
with a seller of type equal to their own, and therefore, a deviating type q seller will
be matched to the highest type who is left in the market after all the top buyers are
assortatively matched, which is t.
Finally, consider a high type buyer, v ∈
¡
t, 1
¤
. If he decides to join the interme-
diary, he will participate in an assortative matching, where he is the highest type.
Consequently, he will be matched with the highest type seller who joins the inter-
mediary in equilibrium, q = t. This gives his deviation payoﬀ (10), and establishes
Lemma 1.
The proof hinges on the comparison between equilibrium and deviation
payoﬀs. Of the latter, (8) and (10) in Lemma 1 are relatively straightforward,
(9) less so. To evaluate it, it is necessary to determine whether a type t ∈£
t, t
¤
, who should join the intermediary in equilibrium, would trade in the first
period, if he/she deviated instead and were matched in the direct market. To
proceed, compact notation by writing
¡
tq − λ
2
(q2 + tt)
¢
f (q) as h (q, t, t), and
1−
√
1−λ2(t/t)
λ as R (t/t), and write (9) as:R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
³
t, λt
2
2t−λt
´
, (11)R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+
R t
R(t/t)
t
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
h
λt2
2t−λt ,
λ
2−λt
i
, (12)R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+
R 1
t
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
³
λ
2−λt , t
i
. (13)
Figure ?? illustrates this. The coloured subset in the diagram depicts the
combinations of types (v, q) such that if a type v ∈
£
t, t
¤
deviates and is matched
to type q ∈ [0, t) ∪
¡
t, 1
¤
, then trade occurs. These points are those above and
to the right of the locus determined by the two curves q =
v−
√
v2−λ2vt
λ and
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λ . This locus intersects the line t at v =
λt
2−λ ; it also intersects the
diagonal at v = λt
2−λ . It reaches its leftmost point (a minimum on the vertical
axis) at point (v = λ2t, q = λt), and it has a horizontal asymptote at q = λ
2
t.
Finally, it intersect the line q = 1 at v = λ
2−λt , and the line
v
λ
¡
1−
√
1− λ2
¢
at
v = t.
A further noteworthy feature illustrated in Lemma 1 is the dependence of
traders’ continuation payoﬀ on the first period actions of the other traders.
For example, a trader of type t ∈
£
t, t
¤
contemplating a deviation has a no
trade payoﬀ given by λtt, since we have assumed the second period matching
to be perfectly assortative. This captures the idea that an “intermediate”
type trader needs to take into account the fact that tomorrow, he will likely be
“mismatched”, given that his natural partner — the types similar to his — will be
rare, as they have traded today through the intermediary. This likely mismatch
will be understood and exploited by his period 1 match, and so deviating from
the equilibrium strategy reduces a trader’s current bargaining power.
We are now ready to present our main result.
Proposition 3 If the density of the distribution of attributes f(t) is Lipschitz
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continuous at 0, then for any λ > 1
2
, there exists c∗ > 0 such that, for every
c ∈ [0, c∗], there exists a non-degenerate
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium.
Proof. We begin by considering the special case of a degenerate sandwich
equilibrium, t = 0, and no entry fee, c = 0. Our argument will be based on the
concept of
©
t, t
ª
-almost strict sandwich equilibrium,
©
t, t
ª
-ASSE for short. This is
a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium where all traders, with the exception of trader t = 0,
strictly prefer to follow their equilibrium strategy rather than deviate; trader t = 0
is indiﬀerent. We first show that there are
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE’s. Next we establish the
existence of a
©
ε, t
ª
-ASSE: it is possible to increase the lower bound of the set of
“joiners” slightly above 0, to some ε > 0, and maintain the property that all traders,
including traders in (0, ε], strictly prefer to follow their equilibrium strategy rather
than to deviate. This establishes the proposition for the special case c = 0. Since all
traders who join the intermediary strictly prefer to do so, it is possible to choose a
positive c such that this continues to be the case, establishing the Proposition.
To begin, therefore, we first want to show that, for some t ∈ (0, 1), when t = 0 and
c = 0, the types in
¡
0, t
¢
(the “degenerate” middle) prefer to join the intermediary
and the types above t prefer not to. Formally:
t2 >
R
(t,1] max
©
tq − λ2 q2, 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ ¡0, t¤ , (14)R
(t,1] max
©
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
, 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > max½tt− λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
, 0
¾
for t ∈
£
t, 1
¤
.
(15)
To ensure almost strictness, we require that both (14) and (15) be satisfied at t. Take
constraint (15), and evaluate it for the marginal type, t = t. We need to show thatR
(t,1] max
n
tq − λ2
³
q2 + t
2
´
, 0
o
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > (1− λ) t2.
This is implied by R
(t,1]
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > µ1− λ
2
¶
t
2. (16)
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Note that the LHS in (16) is the average value of the function g (q) = tq − λ2 q2 in
the interval [t, 1], while the RHS is g(t). g(q) is a negative quadratic and hence it
reaches its minimum on [t, 1] either at t or at 1. Consequently, a suﬃcient condition
for the strict inequality to hold is that g(t) = t2
¡
1− λ2
¢
≤ t − λ2 = g(1). This is
equivalent to t ∈
h
λ
2−λ , 1
i
, which is non-empty for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Next, we show that
if the inequality is satisfied for the marginal type, t = t, it is also satisfied for all
types t > t . Note first that whenever tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
> tt− λ2
³
t2 + t
2
´
for every t,
it is also true that q ∈ [t, 1], and therefore (15) is implied byR
(t,1]
¡
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ − tt+ λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
> 0 for t ∈
£
t, 1
¤
.
Diﬀerentiate the LHS of the above with respect to t:R
(t,1] (q − λt) f(q)dq
1− F (t) −
¡
t− λt
¢
.
Note that the first term is the average of h(q) = q − λt in the interval [t, 1], while
the second is h(t). As h(q) is increasing in q, the above is positive and so (15) holds
for t ∈
h
λ
2−λ , 1
i
.
Next consider (14), which requires that types in
£
0, t
¤
prefer to join the interme-
diary rather than deviate. (14) can be written as expressions (11)-(13), which, for
t = 0, reduce to (note that limt→0R (t/t) = 2λt):
t2 > 0 for t ∈
³
0, λt2
´
,
t2 >
R t
2λ
t
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ hλt2 , λ2i,
t2 >
R 1
t
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ ¡λ2 , t¤.
The first line is clearly true. Consider the second. Since 2λt < 1, the RHS does not
exceed the average of k(q) = tq − λ2 q2 in the set
h
t, 2tλ
i
. k(q) is a negative quadratic
with its global maximum at q = tλ , which is to the left of
2t
λ . Therefore its maximum
in
h
t, 2tλ
i
is either at q = t or at q = tλ . Hence, a suﬃcient condition for the second
line to hold with slack (given that k(q) is not constant) is t2 ≥ max
n
k(t), k
³
t
λ
´o
=
22
max
n
tt− λ2 t
2
, t
2
2λ
o
. When t ≤ t the LHS of the quadratic inequality t2−tt+ λ2 t
2 ≥ 0
has no real roots for λ ≥ 12 . Therefore for λ ≥
1
2 the condition in the second line is
always satisfied.
Finally, the third line. We have the same situation as with the second line, except
that now the maximum of k(q) might be reached at q = 1, as tλ may be greater than
one. Hence, we have the additional condition: t2 ≥ t− λ2 , which again is guaranteed
for λ ≥ 12 .
We have thus shown that when λ ≥ 12 and c = 0, there exists a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE for
any t ≥ λ2−λ ≥
1
3 . The next Lemma ensures that this continues to be the case if
the lower bound of the middle group, those who join the intermediary, is increased
slightly.
Lemma 2 Let c = 0, and let t be such that there exists a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE. Then there
exists ε > 0 such that there exists an
©
ε, t
ª
-ASSE.
Proof. Take a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE and a t > 0. All types t ∈ (0, t) will still strictly
prefer not to deviate, as by symmetry and the fact that they would be on the longer
side of the sub-market, they will not be matched if they join the intermediary. Types
in
¡
t, 1
¤
, will become more inclined to deviate as they now might be matched with a
trader from the bottom slice. However, as we have started from a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE, by
the continuity of payoﬀs in t (due to the Lipschitz continuity of f), we can take a
small enough t > 0 that keeps the top types from deviating. Thus, to establish the
lemma we only need to show that for some t > 0, types t ∈
£
t, t
¤
strictly prefer not
to deviate. Since we had a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE, (12) and (13) are still satisfied for t > 0
suﬃciently small, so we only need to check that (11) holds. Rewriting it in full:
t2 −
R t
t
1−
√
1−λ2 tt
λ
¡
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + tt
¢¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
− λtt > 0 for t ∈
³
t, λt
2
2t−λt
´
. (17)
We first evaluate (17) at t = t, which is the lower end of the range, obtaining,
(1− λ)t2 − 1
P (t)
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f(q)dq > 0, (18)
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since t > 0. Recall that r = 1−
√
1−λ2
λ , and let P (t) = 1 − F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t). Next
diﬀerentiate the LHS of (18) with respect to t:
2 (1− λ) t+ f (t)
P (t)2
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
1
P (t)
½
(1− λ) t2f (t)− r
µ
r − λ
2
¡
1 + r2
¢¶
t2f (rt) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
.
Note that r − λ2
¡
1 + r2
¢
= 0, and so the above is
2 (1− λ) t+ f (t)
P (t)2
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
1
P (t)
½
(1− λ) t2f (t) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
,
which is 0 at t = 0. Had this been positive the proof would be complete. Instead,
we need to check the second derivative:
2 (1− λ) +
d f(t)
P (t)2
dt
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
2f (t)
P (t)2
½
(1− λ) t2f (t) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
−
1
P (t)
½
2 (1− λ) tf (t) + (1− λ) t2f 0 (t) + t (1− λ) f (t)− r (tr − λt) f (tr)−
Z t
tr
λf (q) dq
¾
.
Evaluating the above at t = 0:
2 (1− λ) +
d f(t)
P (t)2
dt
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq − (1− λ) t
2f 0 (t)
P (t)
.
or
2 (1− λ) + f
0 (t)
P (t)
½
1
P (t)
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq − (1− λ) t2
¾
.
The requirement that f be Lipschitz continuous at 0 implies that f 0 (0) is finite, and
therefore the above is 2 (1− λ) > 0 at t = 0. Hence, the LHS of (18) is convex, which
establishes the Lemma.
The Lemma implies that, whenever both
©
0, t
ª
and
©
ε, t
ª
are ASSEs, in the latter
equilibrium all the joining players strictly prefer to join the intermediary, as their
equilibrium payoﬀ is the same but their deviation payoﬀ is lower. Consequently,
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there is a suﬃciently small cε > 0 such that
©
ε, t
ª
is an ASSE when the joining fee
is cε or less. This establishes the Proposition.
This existence result holds regardless of the distribution of types, f ,16 and
is therefore very general. However it clearly does not characterise fully the
set of sandwich equilibria: as intuition suggests, and the technique of the proof
confirms, there is a rich multiplicity of sandwich equilibria:17 specifically, the set
of sandwich equilibria has, generically, full dimensionality in the set of possible
values of t and t,
©
t, t ∈ [0, 1] |t < tª.18 Intuitively, sandwich equilibria exist
if a number of incentive constraints are satisfied, and the proof of Proposition
3 shows that it is possible to select
©
t, t
ª
such that all these constraints are
slack at the
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium. This implies that the set of sandwich
equilibria contains
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibria which have the property that there
exists ε such that for every {v, v} satisfying |t− v|+ ¯¯t− v¯¯ < ε there is also a
{v, v}-sandwich equilibrium. This can be interpreted as giving our equilibrium
16The requirement that f be Lipschitz continuous at 0 is a suﬃcient condition, which
is used to prove existence, but is not necessary: sandwich equilibria exist even when the
condition is violated.
17The defining feature of a sandwich equilibrium is that the “top” and the “bottom”
traders do not join the intermediary: this feature is in contrast to the “threshold” equilibria
identified by the literature, where the highest types join the intermediary. There might also
exist more complex equilibria, for example, sandwiches with three slices: the unit segment
is divided in five intervals, such that type in the first, third and fifth stay out and those in
the second and fourth interval join the intermediary: in this case the middle interval has a
“hole”, that is there are types in
£
t, t
¤
who do not join the intermediary. This is analogous
to Bloch and Ryder’s (2000) finding that there might be threshold equilibria where there
are “holes” in the distribution of joiners (Theorem 3.5, p 107). This can only happen if the
intermediary charges a proportional commission, not, as here, a flat fee. We also conjecture
that there exist asymmetric sandwich equilibria, where the intervals of joiners are diﬀerent
on the two sides of the market, though their measure is the same.
18In Section 4.5, we use computer simulations to provide a full characterisation of the set
of sandwich equilibria, for specific values of the two parameters and restricting attention to
the uniform distribution.
25
set a degree of robustness to the introduction of small errors in the matching
technology available to the intermediary. Suppose, for example, that matching
through the intermediary is perfectly assortative with probability (1− ε), and
random with probability ε, with ε > 0 and “small”. This would reduce slightly
the benefit of joining the intermediary, given in (6), (8) and (10), and therefore
make a deviation slightly less attractive for types in
¡
t, 1
¤
, and slightly more
attractive for types in [0, t). Conversely, it would make following the equilibrium
strategy slightly more (less) attractive for types below (above) the average of
the types in
£
t, t
¤
. Except at the boundary of the set of sandwich equilibria,
a suﬃciently small ε would not prevent a pair
©
t, t
ª
from being a sandwich
equilibrium.
The “robust” nature of sandwich equilibria may suggest that they are some-
what easy to obtain. This, however, is definitely not the case: existence of
sandwich equilibria is subject to quite stringent conditions. These conditions
illustrate the crucial role played by the continuation value, which must be such
that higher types have a better outside option, and therefore also provide the
intuitive reason for the emergence of sandwich equilibria. The following propo-
sition establishes this formally.19
Proposition 4 If the continuation value is constant across types, then there
are no sandwich equilibria.
Proof. Let the discounted value of the common option be denoted by ` > 0, the
same for all traders. We prove the Proposition by contradiction. Suppose therefore
that there does exist a sandwich equilibrium. Let x be the supremum of types who
join the intermediary at this equilibrium. Then, for any y > x, the following two
19Damiano and Li (2007, p. 260) conjecture that type dependent reservation utilities
would not alter the “threshold” structure of the equilibria. Our paper can therefore be seen
as limiting the applicability of this conjecture.
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inequalities must hold:
x2 − c ≥ xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) + `Pr (xv < `) , (19)
yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) + `Pr (yv < `) ≥ yx− c. (20)
The probabilities and expectations on the RHS of (19) and on the LHS of (20) are
taken relative to the distribution of types who do not join in equilibrium. The LHS
of both (19) and (20) is the equilibrium payoﬀ: (19) requires that type x, who joins
the intermediary and receives payoﬀ x2 − c, is better-oﬀ than at her outside option,
otherwise she would not join. If she does not join, trade takes place if 2yv − 2` ≥ 0,
splitting the gross surplus equally; otherwise she collects her outside option, `. The
RHS in (19) and (20) is the deviation payoﬀ: if the type who joins were to deviate,
she would be randomly matched with a non-joiner and would save the fee. Vice
versa, if a type who should not join in equilibrium decided to join instead, she would
pay the fee and be assortatively matched with a trader on the other side, whose type
will be arbitrarily close to x, the supremum of the joiners. As y > x, either trade
occurs, giving y the payoﬀ in the inequality or it is y who refuses to trade to obtain
an even higher payoﬀ.
Rearranging inequalities (19) and (20), we have
x2 − xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `)− `Pr (xv < `) ≥ c (21)
≥ yx− yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) .
Next, note that
xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) + `Pr (xv < `) ≥ xE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) + `Pr (yv < `) .
This holds because the LHS is type x’s optimal deviation payoﬀ, while the RHS
assumes that (following a deviation) sometimes x trades even if it gives her less than
her outside option.
Hence a necessary condition for (21) to hold is that
x2 − xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) ≥ c
≥ yx− yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) ,
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or
(x− y) (x−E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)) ≥ 0. (22)
Note that, by (21), x − E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) ≥ `Pr(xv<`)+cx > 0. Thus if we can
show that there exists y > x such thatE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)−E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) <
`Pr(xv<`)+c
x , then x − E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) > 0 and hence (22) implies a contra-
diction. Such a y indeed exists because — by construction — all types between x and
y do not join the intermediary; since the type distribution contains no mass points,
E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) is continuous in y, soE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)−E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `)
converges continuously to 0 as y tends to x.
The logic underlying this result is that a uniform outside option has no eﬀect
on the outcome of bargaining; the gross surplus is divided equally between the
parties. This is exactly the same as if utility were non-transferable: our paper
therefore shows that transferability of utility is necessary for sandwich equilibria
to exist. Intuitively, the fifty-fifty arrangement implied by uniform continuation
value or non-transferable utility makes meeting high types very attractive, and
thus puts an upper bound on the relative probability of meeting a high type if
not joining the intermediary. On the other hand, this very fifty-fifty split also
makes meeting low types not very attractive, because they will have a good
deal of bargaining power. To keep high types from joining the intermediary the
relative probability of meeting a low type if not joining the intermediary must
be low. With uniform continuation values, these two requirements cannot be
simultaneously met. To alter the constraints so as to make them compatible
with each other, the bargaining outcome needs to favour the higher types.
Having a continuation value which is increasing in the type does just that.
4 Discussion
4.1. We have assumed perfect information: upon meeting, the traders can
observe each other’s type. Imperfect observability would generate asymmetry
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of information and give rise to a potential for signalling. The decision whether
or not to join the intermediary conveys some information, and thus it aﬀects
a trader’s payoﬀ not just because it aﬀects the range of potential partners,
but also because it aﬀects the partner’s beliefs about one’s type. Analysis of
a model which incorporates both asymmetric information and the possibility
of joining an intermediary is likely to be beyond tractability. Interestingly,
in a pure signalling set-up, Feltovich et al. (2002) show that there can be
equilibria with non-monotone signalling strategies, known in the literature as
counter-signalling. In these equilibria, only middle types send the costly signal,
while low types and high types pool by not sending it.20 The analogy with the
outcome of our model suggests that, in situations where there is a binary choice
(join the intermediary or send the signal), non-monotonicity of the equilibrium
strategies in type is a common outcome (Renou, 2010, is another example).
4.2. Some of the existing literature (e.g. Yavas¸, 1994, Bloch and Ryder, 2000)
considers a fee proportional to the benefit from trade, as is the case when the in-
termediary charges a commission. Charging a commission has of course a much
higher information requirement than a flat fee, and in fact in many markets
(online dating, mortgage brokering and shopping centres are examples) the fee
charged is flat. A second reason why we have chosen to model the case of a flat
fee is that it makes our result stronger, as a proportional commission makes the
existence of sandwich equilibria easier : with a flat fee, when middle types join,
it is certainly the case that the high types will not forgo intermediation due
to its cost, which may happen with a proportional commission. Finally, note
20As an example, suppose there are three types, H > M > L, and the signal is binary.
Suppose that H types are much more likely to be associated with one signal while L types
with the other, while M types are associated with either with equal probability. In such a
situation, H is suﬃciently confident that she will be told apart from L and hence she is more
interested in distinguishing herself from M. AsM is signalling to distinguish himself from L,
the way for H to be diﬀerent is by not signalling.
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that the existence of non-degenerate sandwich equilibria is not due to the flat
fee excluding the lower quality segment from intermediation, since our result
holds for zero fee.
4.3. We assume that the intermediary does not choose the fee strategically
(unlike, among others, Damiano and Li, 2007). The main purpose of this pa-
per is to show the possibility that sandwich equilibria might exist. The fee
could simply reflect the cost, as it would be the case with a welfare maximising
intermediary (or with suﬃciently intense competition among intermediaries).
On the other hand, in the presence of multiple equilibria it is not straightfor-
ward how to identify the best strategy for a profit maximising intermediary. As
the example in 4.5 shows, sandwich equilibria exist only for small fees, while
threshold equilibria exist for higher fees too. Imagine, for example, that the
intermediary would like to raise the price in order to move from a sandwich
equilibrium to a more profitable threshold equilibrium. It is unlikely that the
top players, who do not join, would at some price high enough decide instead
to do so.
4.4. A further assumption we made is that the intermediary has access to a
perfect matching technology, whereas trading in the direct market gives rise to
perfectly random matching. In practice, of course, both are approximations.
Relaxing them has in general an ambiguous eﬀect on the attractiveness of using
the intermediary. On the one hand, real world trading in the direct market is
far from random: for example, high quality singles who do not join a lonely
heart agency but choose to search by patronising nightclubs are much more
likely to meet a high quality potential partner, since the choice of nightclubs
or similar venues is clearly not random: dress codes, bouncers, high prices
for drinks are all imperfect substitutes for membership fees. This reduces the
opportunity cost of not joining, reducing further the non-joiners’ incentive to
join. Moreover, if the intermediary has access to a technology less perfect
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than what we have assumed here, then again joining it clearly becomes less
attractive. A countervailing tendency is the fact that, while we have assumed
that matching occurs with probability 1 both through the intermediary and in
the direct market, in practice the frequency of matches would be lower in the
direct market.
An important insight of our analysis is that a technological advantage by
the intermediary is a necessary condition for the existence of sandwich equi-
libria. To see this, suppose that matching through the intermediary is in fact
random. In this case, for c = 0, there is a unique sandwich equilibrium:21 this
is given by the condition that the average type is the same in the direct and the
intermediated markets. But now consider a strictly positive fee, c > 0. Because
of supermodularity, diﬀerent types would be indiﬀerent at diﬀerent diﬀerences
in averages, so only threshold equilibria can exist.
4.5. A natural question of interest is the shape and size of the set of sandwich
equilibria. This matters because, if it turned out in practice that any sandwich
equilibrium is arbitrarily close to a threshold equilibrium, which is a degenerate
{t, 1}-sandwich equilibrium, then our analysis would not be able to explain the
observed regularity which motivate it, that “a lot” of top traders do not use
intermediation. While characterising in general the set of sandwich equilibria
is hard, a simple example suﬃces to address this question. In Figure ??,22 we
illustrate the entire set of sandwich equilibria in the special case of a uniform
density function for v and q, that is when f (t) ≡ 1. The two diagrams depict
the lower portion of [0, 1]2 (note that the diagonal is not a 45 degree line, as
the axes are drawn in diﬀerent scales). The highlighted regions are the sets
21Provided we maintain the assumption of assortative matching in the second period.
22The appendix (available on request or at sites.google.com/site/giannidefraja/) provides
details of how the pictures have been obtained. In essence, it was a “brute force” process:
given t and t we checked that no trader in [0, 1] had an incentive to deviate, and repeated the
procedure on a fine grid, checking for every possible pair of points
¡
t, t
¢
below the diagonal.
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of sandwich equilibria for two values each of c and λ. In both diagrams, the
shaded (respectively outlined) area represents combinations of points
¡
t, t
¢
such
that a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium exists when c = 0 (respectively c = .0005).
For c = 0 and λ > 1/2, the set of sandwich equilibria is drawn on the RHS
of Figure 3: the lower contour of the set is the set of points on the horizontal
axis between a critical value of t and 1; the upper contour of the sandwich
equilibrium set is a locus strictly above 0 for t < 1, which tends to 0 as t
tends to 1. When c is positive, clearly there cannot be equilibria where the
lowest types join the intermediary: they simply cannot aﬀord the fee. Note
the “multiplier” eﬀect of the fee: the types just below the lowest type who
join are not deterred from joining by the fee, which is but a tiny fraction of
their valuation. The relatively high lower bound is needed in equilibrium as,
if there were too few low types joining, then the highest types who should
join the intermediary would prefer to deviate as they would be likely to be
matched with types from the upper end of the distribution. The multiplier
eﬀect implies that highest value of c such that sandwich equilibria exist is“very
low”, the intermediation fee must be small, compared to the average or median
valuation.
In the diagram threshold equilibria are represented by points on the vertical
segment joining (1, 0) and (1, 1). By Proposition 2, all points on a vertical
segment with its lower end at (1, 0) are threshold equlibria, and, for c = 0, by
Corollary 2 the set of threshold equilibria is the entire segment joining (1, 0)
and (1, 1). Note therefore that, for c = 0, the equilibrium set (the union of
the set of sandwich and of threshold equilibria) is connected for high λ and
disconnected for low λ. Numerical simulations suggest that, for the uniform
density case we considered the cut-oﬀ value of λ is 1
2
. As Proposition 3 gives
suﬃcient conditions, it is not surprising that there exist sandwich equilibria
for λ < 1/2 as well. Note that, as shown in Figure 3, in the low λ case, t
can be very low, and even for λ high there are sandwich equilibria where no
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trader above the median uses the intermediary. For c = 0 sandwich equilibria,
unlike threshold equilibria, are “rare”, suggesting that a simple “coordination
equilibrium” story is not all is needed to explain their emergence.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to our understanding of markets where intermediaries
are active but traders may also choose to trade unassisted.
Stylised facts indicate that trader behaviour may be non-monotone. For ex-
ample, consider the role of education in the marriage market: the widespread
evidence of assortative education matching (for example, Blossfeld and Timm,
2003) indicates that education is a supermodular characteristic: more educated
individuals value it more. With this in mind, consider the diagram in Figure
4. It is an illustration derived from the dataset constructed by Hitsch et al
(2010). They study the link between mate preference and match formation,
and report data on the education level of internet users at large and a rep-
resentative sample of the members of a major online dating service provider
in San Diego and Boston. In the picture, we choose convenient thresholds in
their ranking to determine three groups. The figure plots the percentage of
internet users belonging to each group who have joined the dating service. The
diagram suggests a non-monotonic relation between “type” and the propensity
to join the intermediary: those with intermediate education levels are consid-
erably more likely to use the online provider than types with higher or lower
education.23
In this paper we have rigorously established that this non-monotone be-
23The diagram is only suggestive, as clearly only a small fraction of the internet users are
looking for a partner in the period considered. It seems plausible that the likelihood of being
looking for a partner is roughly independent of education. In this case, if we conditioned the
joining probabilities on actually being looking for a partner, the height of each bar would
increase roughly proportionally, and their relative size would not change.
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Source: Authors' elaboration from Hitsch et al (2010)
San Diego Boston
haviour, where the traders who have the most to gain from using the superior
matching mechanism provided by the intermediary choose not to use it, may
indeed form part of an equilibrium. The existence of such “sandwich” equilib-
ria, however, is subject to the strong condition that the traders’ continuation
value is suﬃciently increasing in their type. Consequently the intertemporal
characteristics of each market determine whether or not sandwich equilibria can
exist: high type traders have most to gain from trade now, this must continue
to be the case if they choose to delay trade.
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